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Non–technical summary
This paper generates estimates of the parameters of a two-sided market model of com-
peting magazine publishers. We use panel data from the German magazine industry that
spans the period 1972 to 2003. A key question of this paper is what is the markup over
marginal cost charged to advertisers relative to that charged to readers? Our results are
consistent with the conventional wisdom that advertisers value readers more than readers
value advertisements, and that as a result, magazines “subsidize” cover prices, and make
their profit from advertisers.
We apply our estimated model to consider cross-market comparative statics. Reflecting
that advertisers value readers more than readers value advertisers, we find an increase in
reader demand results in an increase in ad rates while an increase in advertising demand
results in a decrease in cover prices. This asymmetric result reflects the incentive to
subsidize readers to attract additional advertisers when the advertising side becomes more
lucrative, but not vice-versa. Rather, if demand on the reader side increases (or costs fall),
our estimated model implies there is an incentive to increase ad rates so as exploit the
resulting increased demand on the advertising side.
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Abstract
We present and estimate a model of competition in a two-sided market: the
market for magazine readership and advertising. Using data on magazines in Ger-
many, we find evidence that magazines have properties of two-sided markets. The
results are consistent with the perception that prices for readers are “subsidized”
and magazines make most of their money from advertisers. Consistent with ad-
vertisers valuing readers more than readers value advertisements, our results imply
that higher demand or lower costs on the reader side increase ad rates, but that
higher demand or lower costs on the advertising side decrease cover prices.
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1 Introduction
Many markets where network externalities are important are, in fact, two-sided markets.
Two-sided markets have the property that there are two distinct types of users, each of
which wishes to interact on a common platform, and in which the structure of prices
between the two sides (rather than just the total level of prices) matters.1 Some com-
mon examples include directory services such as classifieds and Yellow Pages; matching
markets such as employment websites, dating agencies; media markets such as magazines,
newspapers and Internet Portals; and trading posts such as auctions, B2B markets, and
shopping malls.
A key question arising in two-sided markets is how does the platform price to each type
of user? Is one side of the market “subsidized” in order to attract the other? Armstrong
(2004), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), and Rochet and Tirole (2003) each provide theoretical
frameworks of two-sided markets to explain how the structure of prices is determined. This
paper takes one such framework and uses it to explore magazine markets in Germany.
The model considered is based on an adapted version of Armstrong’s model with
exclusive intermediation. In the model, two differentiated platforms set joining fees, and
users on each side exclusively subscribe to one of the platforms. Advertisers value the
number of readers of the magazine and readers value the number of ads in the magazine.
In addition, we allow readers to value the amount of content in the magazine. A magazine
chooses a cover price, an advertising price and the amount of content to produce in order to
maximize its profits, given the prices and content choice of the rival magazine. We derive
the implied demand system from such a model and estimate it using data on magazines
from Germany. The model then provides a link between the estimated demand parameters
and the structure of price-cost margins across readers and advertisers, as well as other
variables of interest.
There is a large existing empirical literature on media markets that allows for inter-
related demands between readers and advertisers. Dewenter (2003) provides a survey.
Much of this literature focuses on the newspaper industry, and is concerned with estimat-
ing the effects of concentration (Reddaway, 1963 and Thompson, 1984), the existence of
economies of scale (Rosse, 1967, 1970; Bucklin et al. 1989); and showing the existence
of two-way network effects (Dertouzos and Trautman, 1990).2 Typically, newspapers are
assumed to be monopolistic with respect to the readership side. As a result, unlike this
paper, the literature does not consider how the structure of prices emerges from competi-
tion between two platforms that strategically set prices to each side to take into account
interrelated demands.
1See Rochet and Tirole (2004) for a more precise definition. See also Evans (2003a, 2003b).
2There is also a sizeable empirical literature testing for network effects in one-sided market settings,
including amongst others, Gandal et al. (2000) who consider the case of compact disk players, and Saloner
and Shepard (1995) who consider the case of Automated Teller Machines. The issue addressed in this
paper, that of the structure of prices between each side of the market, does not arise in this literature.
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More recently, Rysman (2004) estimates a two-sided model of Yellow Pages that allows
for such competition. However, in the case of Yellow Pages, only one side (the advertising
side) faces fees. This means Rysman cannot consider the determination of the structure
of prices with his data. Moreover, he assumes quantity setting platforms to avoid the fixed
point problem that arises in a price setting game with network effects. This motivates
our focus on magazines, as well as our particular model specification which allows us to
study the structure of price-cost margins with estimates of the demand system alone.
Magazines, like newspapers, typically involve both readers and advertisers being charged.
Moreover, unlike other examples of two-sided markets where both sides are charged (for
example, payment cards and video game platforms), magazines do not involve widespread
multihoming on either side, and so provide a better match to the model of exclusive plat-
form competition considered by Armstrong.3 The nature of magazine pricing also matches
the assumption made in this framework, in that users on each side pay to “join” the plat-
form (rather than based on transactions made between the two types of users), and that
there are markets with only two magazines competing.
The parameters of the model are estimated using an unbalanced panel of nine distinct
two-magazine groups in Germany during the period 1972-2003. We illustrate how the
estimated parameters can then be used to determine the size of the network effects running
in each direction (how much readers value ads, and how much advertisers value readers),
and how the structure of the price-cost margins and cross-market comparative static
results reflect asymmetries across the two sides of the market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model of a two-
sided market that we estimate. Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 describes
our empirical specification. Results and implications are presented in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 provides some concluding comments.
2 A model of magazines as a two-sided market
We adapt the generic model of two-sided exclusive platform intermediation developed
by Armstrong (2004, Section 4) to the magazine market. His model is one in which two
platforms compete. Competition on each side of the market is modelled in a differentiated
Bertrand fashion, with demands derived from a Hotelling specification. The complication
is that each group values the number of users of the opposite group on the same platform.
We extend this model in a straightforward way by noting magazines provide three types
of services. They provide content for readers, ads which allow readers to find out about
products (possibly) of interest, and an advertising outlet which provides firms with a way
to inform readers about their products. Specifically, we allow subscribers’ utility to also
depend on the number of content pages in the magazine, and let magazine publishers
3For our sample, most readers do not buy both rival magazines and most firms do not advertise in
both rival magazines. We provide evidence for this in Appendix B.
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choose content pages as an additional strategic variable.
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+ φ+ ρ (S1 − S2)− η (a1 − a2) + ξ1 − ξ2 (3)
na2 = 1− na1, (4)
where si = Si/S is the share of readers of magazine i out of a total of S readers for
both magazines, and nai = N
a
i /N is the share of ads in magazine i out of a total of N
ads in both magazines. The amount of content in magazine i is captured by N ci , while
pi is the price per copy that magazine i charges readers and ai is the price per ad that
magazine i charges advertisers. The error terms εi and ξi capture unobservable (mean
zero) components to the utilities of each group from each magazine, while the parameters
b and φ capture unobservable asymmetries in preference between the two magazines. The
parameters measuring the strength of network effects in each direction are γ and ρ, while
the intensity of competition (or the inverse of the extent of product differentiation) is
measured by the parameters β and η.
These share equations assume all agents choose one of the magazines exclusively. In
appendix B, we show how the model here can be reinterpreted to allow for the fact some
agents choose both magazines (multihome). We also show that such multihoming is not
widespread in the markets we consider. Both findings provide support for the approach
we take.
The profits of the publisher of magazine i are then
Πi = (pi − fi)Si + (ai − ci)Nai − di (N ci )2 − Fi, (5)
where fi is the cost of printing and distributing the magazine per copy sold
5, ci is the cost
of producing a single ad for magazine i, di is the cost of producing a page of content (that
also varies between the magazines), and Fi is other fixed costs of operations. Variable
cost that are associated with producing ads include liasing with clients on each ad. Note
that content is costly to produce. It only contributes to profit to the extent it causes an
increase in circulation, and indirectly ad revenue. Moreover, content is assumed to have
increasing marginal costs (it is more and more expensive to get additional interesting
stories and material for each issue).
Each magazine sets pi, ai and N
c
i to maximize its profits, given the choices of its
rival. After observing the choice of these variables, consumers (readers) decide which
4Appendix A provides the derivation of this demand specification.
5In the case the magazines are sold via subscription, this includes the cost of postage and handling,
while if the magazines are sold via kiosks, newsstands and bookstores, then this includes the payment
that these retailers require. Unlike the case in the United States, in Germany most subscription prices
are quite similar to those offered at the newsstands (Kaiser, 2003).
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magazine to buy and firms (advertisers) decide which magazine to advertise in. Rational
expectations are assumed, so readers and advertisers work out how many of each type
will subscribe to each magazine using the above model when making their own decision.
Provided network benefits are not explosive (which requires ργNS < 1/4, a condition
that will be checked empirically), rational expectations imply unique demands, which are
the simultaneous solutions to (1)-(4).
Solving for unique demands, substituting these into (5) for i = 1 and 2, and taking
the first order conditions, we can express the equilibrium conditions for both magazines
as:


















Equilibrium cover prices are marked up above cost to the extent of product differen-
tiation on the readership side, but discounted to reflect the externality generated on the
advertising side of the market from a magazine attracting more readers. In equilibrium,
the magazines discount cover prices to attract more readers, thereby attracting more ad-
vertisers. This effect is increasing in the extent to which advertisers value readers and in
the number of firms wanting to place ads in magazine i, and is decreasing in the sensitivity
of a magazine’s ad demand to its ad rate (if ad demand is very sensitive to ad rates, then
lowering ad rates becomes a cheaper way for magazines to generate additional advertisers
rather than subsidizing readers).
Likewise, equilibrium ad rates are marked up above cost to the extent of product dif-
ferentiation on the advertisers’ side, but are discounted to reflect the externality generated
on the readership side of the market from a magazine attracting more ads. If attracting
more ads allows a magazine to attract more readers, then the magazine will take this
into account when pricing ads. Specifically, magazines will discount the price of ads by
the extent to which readers value ads and by the number of readers of magazine i, but
will increase ad prices when readers are more sensitive to a magazine’s cover price (if
readers are very sensitive to cover prices, then lowering cover prices is a cheaper way for
magazines to generate additional readers rather than discounting the price of ads).
For both cover prices and ad prices, the markup above cost is higher the higher the
respective equilibrium market shares reflecting the fact that if a magazine is preferred by
readers or advertisers (has a positive value of b or φ), this will cause that magazine to
price higher to exploit its more ‘loyal’ customer base.
Finally, the level of content is increasing in the amount readers value content and in
the total number of magazine readers (since then each page of content generates more
revenue), but is decreasing in the cost of producing content and in the sensitivity of
magazine readers’ demand to the cover price (if readers are very sensitive to cover prices,
4
then lowering cover prices is a cheaper way for magazines to generate additional readers
rather than producing additional content).
Our estimation approach is to estimate the share equations (1) and (3) so as to obtain
estimates of the parameters γ, ψ, β, ρ, and η. These can then be used to solve for the
equilibrium price-cost margins (6) and (7), which are the expressions of central interest.
This avoids the need to estimate costs through the first order conditions, which leads
to imprecise estimates of all parameters, given the interrelated nature of the two sides
of the market and only limited data availability. This illustrates the value of using the
linear demand specification in (1)-(4). The Hotelling assumptions on consumer behavior
and the assumed linear network benefits, when combined with profit maximization by
competing platforms, results in equilibrium price-cost margins that are simple observable
functions of the estimated demand parameters (and not of costs). With other types of
demand specifications in which demands are interrelated, this property will generally not
be true, and one requires full system estimation to obtain results.6
3 Data
Our initial data set comprises of quarterly information on cover prices, ad prices, number
of ad pages7, number of content pages, and circulation numbers for German magazines
that existed between the first quarter of 1972 and the fourth quarter of 2003.8 The original
source of our data is the Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von
Werbetraegern e.V. This association ascertains, monitors and publishes information on
magazine dissemination and circulation.
We annualize our quarterly data given cover prices and ad rates do not change within
a year. Our identification of markets with just two competing magazines (‘two-magazine
markets’), a prerequisite to the estimation of the theoretical model, proceeds in two steps.
First, we place each magazine into a unique magazine segment (or magazine submarket)
and then check in what periods between 1972 to 2003 the respective magazine group
consisted of just two competing magazines. The initial magazine grouping follows industry
convention. We use the grouping by Jahreszeitenverlag (1981–2003).9 Jahreszeitenverlag
6Other recent theoretical models of two-sided markets with competing platforms that apply to media
markets, such as those by Anderson and Coate (2002), Ferrando et al. (2004) and Gabszewicz et al. (2001)
all obtain a demand specification for advertising in which the demand for advertising only depends on the
own per-viewer price of advertising, and not the ad rate or the number of readers of the rival platform.
We test some alternative specifications of demand at the end of Section 5.
7For simplicity, we assume ads are all the same size, which we define as ‘one page’. We do not have
any systematic information about advertising sizes but sampling the magazines in our study revealed
that most ads tended to be of the same size (which was one page).
8Our data and software code are available at http://www.ulrichkaiser.com/papers/twosided.html.
9Jahreszeitenverlag is a major German magazine publisher which made its annual publication
Funktions–Analyse: Factbook fu¨r Inhalte und Portraits von Zeitschriften available to us upon request.
We have access to the ‘Factbooks’ from 1992 to 2003.
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distinguishes between 35 different magazine groups. We search for two-magazine markets
inside these 35 distinct groups and identify a total of 18 two-magazine markets that existed
during our period of observation. The number of years of existence range between one
and 31 years.
Table 1 gives an overview of our sample selection. All magazines are published in
German, including those that are originally from foreign countries such as Elle and Vogue.
Magazines also differ substantially from the original foreign version with respect to content
(though not by layout). Since the foreign originals (or other similar foreign magazines)
are difficult to obtain and are typically significantly more expensive, we do not believe
that they impose a competitive constraint on the German equivalents.
Nine out of the 18 two-magazine markets are eliminated because of difficulties in their
definitions or data. Due to missing data for some of the variables, we have to eliminate
‘Fiction magazines’. With only observations on one year, we are also forced to eliminate
‘Fitness’, ‘Youth’ and ‘Riddles’ magazines, as we will be first-differencing our data. We
do not consider ‘Magazines with special character’ (Neue Revue and Reader’s Digest Das
Beste) since they are completely different magazines. Neue Revue is concerned with
the latest gossip surrounding European celebrities, while Reader’s Digest Das Beste is
the German version of Reader’s Digest. We think a more appropriate label for these
magazines would have been ‘miscellaneous’. For similar reasons we also exclude ‘Travel’,
‘Sports’ and ‘Young illustrated’ magazines.10
In total, we are left with only 100 usable observations (91 after first differencing), so
the usual caveats of empirical work with small samples apply. The nine two-magazine
markets that we include in our estimation make up between 2.2 and 8.4 percent of the
total number of titles published in the total German magazine market, between 0.4 and
5.3 percent of total circulation, and between 1.1 and 5.4 percent of total ad pages (in the
time period 1972–2003).
The two most important groups (in terms of observations) are ‘Do-It-yourself’ mag-
azines and ‘Photography’ magazines. Together, these account for 56 percent of all our
usable observations. Some summary statistics on the variables involved in the estimation
are given in Table 2. The mean cover price for a magazine in our sample is 2.85 Euros
(across both magazines from all magazine groups), whereas advertisers pay on average
10,512 Euros per ad. A magazine in our sample has a circulation of about 955,577 per
year on average (the median is 706,680), and runs about 673 ads per year. Magazines
in our sample have slightly more than 3.1 content pages for every ad page. While some
10Specifically, the ‘Travel’ magazines come in a different periodicity and one magazine (Geo Saison)
deals with a wide array of topics while the other one (Merian) exclusively is concerned with a single travel
destination; kicker-sportmagazin, a ‘Sports’ magazine, exclusively reports about soccer events, while Sport
Illustrierte covers a wide range of sport events; and Prinz, a ‘Young illustrated’ magazine, comes in 13
different regional editions, faces significant competition from local newspapers and free city magazines,
and has its focus on reporting on local events, while Max is a regular lifestyle magazine aimed at people
below 35.
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magazines have almost no ads, no magazine in our sample has more ads than content.
The minimum ratio of ad pages to all pages for any magazine-year in our sample is 0.057
while the maximum is 0.454. A simple OLS regression of the ratio of ad pages to all pages
on a constant, as well as linear and quadratic time trends, shows that the advertising
ratio has changed over time, with the maximum ad share reached in 1989.
Our magazines are fairly symmetric, with the average deviation in readership market
shares being 0.136 (a deviation which has been falling over time) and in advertising
market shares being 0.098 (a ratio that has been rather steady). The correlation between
the two market shares is 0.469, and has been falling over time. A positive correlation
is consistent with our model, which implies, ceteris paribus, higher demand on one side
increases demand on the other side and vice-versa.
4 Empirical specification
Recall the empirical approach is to estimate the equations (1) and (3) so as to obtain
estimates of the parameters γ, ψ, β, ρ, and η. We use GMM to jointly estimate the
two equations using our panel data set. To remove magazine-group specific constants
(magazine-group fixed effects) we first difference the data. Our estimated model is
M s1t= γ (M Na1t− M Na2t)+ψ (M N c1t− M N c2t)−β (M p1t− M p2t)+ M ε1t− M ε2t (9)
M na1t= ρ (M S1t− M S2t)−η (M a1t− M a2t)+ M ξ1t− M ξ2t, (10)
where M denotes the first difference operator.
All explanatory variables in (9) and (10) are potentially endogenous. We thus need to
find suitable instruments for circulation, the number of content pages, the number of ad
pages, cover prices, and ad rates.
Our main identifying assumption is that (unobserved) cost factors are common across
magazines published by a magazine’s publisher and that other (demand-side) shocks spe-
cific to the magazine are not correlated with these factors, an approach similar to that
used by Hausman and Taylor (1981), Hausman et al. (1994) and Berry et al. (1995). This
means that cover prices of a publisher’s magazines in other segments of the magazine mar-
ket are assumed to be driven by common underlying costs associated with a publisher’s
production, distribution and marketing of its magazines to readers. These costs also de-
termine the particular magazine’s cover prices, but are assumed to be uncorrelated with
the disturbances in the magazine’s product demand equations, which is why the average
cover price of a publisher’s other magazines can be used as instruments for cover prices.
The same logic applies to the use of the average ad rate of a publisher’s other magazines
as an instrument for a magazine’s ad rate, and the use of the average content pages per
copy of a publisher’s other magazines as an instrument for a magazine’s content pages
per copy.
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Additional cost–side instruments for cover prices, ad rates and content pages per copy
are the natural logarithm of the number of magazine titles published by the own publisher
in a given year (a proxy variable for returns to scope in production) and the the natural
logarithm of the total number of pages printed by the own publisher in a given year (a
proxy for returns to sale in production).
We also assume common (unobserved) demand factors affect publishers, and that these
factors are uncorrelated with the magazine’s marginal cost shocks. For instance, reflecting
perhaps better management, some publishers at certain times may be better than others
at attracting successful editors, across its whole range of magazines. Successful editors
produce popular content that attracts a larger number of readers. Alternatively, a par-
ticular publisher may have access to a wider distribution channel than other publishers,
resulting in higher demand for all its magazines. This suggests that a reasonable instru-
ment for a magazine’s circulation share is the average circulation share of the publisher’s
other magazines. Likewise, a similar logic applies to the advertising side. A particular
publisher may form an ongoing relationship with a large advertising client through one
of its magazines, but this will tend to raise demand for advertising in the publisher’s
other magazines, given some large advertisers may place ads across different magazine
markets (“cross–selling” as it is termed in the media industry). Thus, we use the average
advertising share of a publisher’s other magazines to instrument for the advertising share
of a particular magazine produced by the same publisher. Lagged endogenous variables
are instrumented by the corresponding lagged instruments. Additional instruments are a
constant, a linear and a quadratic time trend.
Our instruments show a high correlation with the explanatory variables. At the same
time, the instruments can be formally tested for their statistical validity by using a test
for orthogonality of the instruments with the residuals of the equations of interest. This
test cannot reject orthogonality of the instruments at the usual significance level.11 A
final undesirable property of share equations is that the error terms are heteroscedastic,
which is corrected for by GMM estimation.
5 Results
GMM estimation results for the equations (9) and (10) are displayed in Table 3. Table
4 displays the corresponding non–instrumented seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)
estimation results. GMM and SUR estimation results differ substantially. For instance,
the SUR model produces a negative coefficient on the effect of the number of content
pages on the demand by readers, which is economically implausible and underscores the
importance of instrumentation.
Magazine readership demand
For GMM estimation, the relative number of content pages in one magazine versus its
11The details are available at http://www.ulrichkaiser.com/papers/twosided.html
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rival is found to be a significant determinant of the share of readers the magazine attracts
within the magazine group. The parameter ψ is positive and statistically significant
(at the 5% level). Magazines with more content attract more readers. The elasticity of
readership share to content share is ψN ci /si. Over our sample, we find a 1 percent increase
in the share of content that a magazine has (relative to total content pages of the two-
magazine group) leads to an estimated 0.168 percent increase in the magazine (market)
share of readers (the standard error is 0.083 implying the result is significant at the 5
percent level, given a p-value of 0.044). The relative number of ad pages is also found to
be significant, both statistically and economically, for readership share. The equivalent
elasticity of readership share on ad share is calculated as γNai /si, which over our sample
implies an estimated elasticity of 0.335 (which is significant at all reasonable levels given
a standard error of 0.048). Although it appears readership share is more sensitive to ad
share than content share, we cannot reject equality of elasticities (Wald test statistic is
1.939, p-value is 0.379).
Our parameter estimate for β, the coefficient on cover prices, is significantly different
from zero suggesting that the difference in cover prices between two magazines is a signif-
icant determinant of readership share in our data. The estimated elasticity of readership
share to cover price (measured as −βpi/si) is −0.494 (the standard error is 0.168 implying
the result is significant even at the 1 percent level, given a p-value of 0.003). This suggests
a 1 percent increase in price of magazine 1 leads to a 0.494 percent drop in the readership
share of magazine 1 (over our sample).
We can use the estimates of ψ, γ and β to compare how much readers value content
versus ads. For instance, an additional content page per year increases each reader’s
utility by ψ, so each reader’s willingness to pay for this increase is ψ/β Euros. Comparing
this to γ/β, each reader’s willingness to pay for one additional ad page per year, we find
that after multiplying by the number of readers, readers in total are willing to pay 17, 711
Euros for an extra 1 percent of content over a year (standard error is 6, 382, implying the
result is significant given a p-value of 0.006), and they are willing to pay 34, 064 Euros for
an extra 1 percent of advertisements over a year (standard error is 14, 366, implying the
result is significant given a p-value of 0.018). Despite the fact it seems readers are willing
to pay more for ads than for content, again we cannot reject equality of the two effects
(Wald test statistic is 0.961, p-value is 0.619).
Magazine advertising demand
The estimated advertising demand equation shows a significant effect of the circulation
of one magazine versus its rival on the share of advertising the magazine attracts from
within the magazine group. The parameter ρ is positive and statistically significant at
the 1 percent significance level. Magazines with more readers are able to attract more
advertisers (for given ad rates). The estimated elasticity of advertising share to readership
share (measured as ρSi/n
a
i ) is 0.462 (which is significant at all reasonable levels given a
standard error of 0.055). This suggests a 1 percent increase in the share of readers of
magazine 1 increases the share of ads in magazine 1 (relative to the group) by 0.462
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percent (over our sample). We also find statistically significant and positive effects of the
difference in ad rates between two magazines on their advertising shares. The estimated
elasticity of advertising share to ad rates (measured as −ηai/nai ) is −0.715 (which is
significant at all reasonable levels given a standard error of 0.176). This suggests a 1
percent increase in the ad rate of magazine 1 leads to a 0.715 percent drop in the share of
ads in magazine 1 (over our sample). These results imply advertisers (in total) are willing
to pay 90, 750 Euros to be able to reach an extra 1 percent of readers over a year (standard
error is 26, 459, implying the result is significant given a p-value of 0.001). Clearly, this is
considerably more than the estimated 34, 064 Euros readers are willing to pay in total to
be able to read an extra 1 percent of ads over a year, although the difference between the
two results is not statistically significant (Wald test statistic is 2.2073, p-value is 0.332).
Checking for non-explosive network effects
For the equilibrium solutions of the theoretical model to be well defined, we require
the expression 1− 4ργNS to be positive. If not, network effects dominate, and the model
predicts tipping to the case where one magazine takes the whole market. Using our
parameter estimates, we calculate the estimated value of this expression over our sample
is 0.547, with a corresponding standard error of 0.055.12 Thus, we can easily reject
explosive network effects. Demands implied by our estimated model are well behaved.
Implied structure of prices-cost markups
One of the key points of interest in a two-sided market is to understand the determi-
nants of the structure of prices. How much is charged to readers versus advertisers? In the
theoretical model we considered, one determinant of the structure of prices is the structure
of costs. The price to readers will reflect the cost of making a sale to an additional reader
(distribution and retailing costs), while the price charged to advertisers will reflect the
cost of including an additional ad in the magazine (the costs of dealing with an additional
client, and producing the ad). Since we do not measure or estimate costs, we concentrate
instead on the structure of price-cost markups. Our particular Hotelling model, if valid,
implies these price-cost markups can be recovered from the demand estimates alone.
Equations (6) and (7) specify the determinants of these price-cost markups. The first
term in each case is a regular Hotelling type markup that reflects transportation cost or
more generally, the degree of product differentiation. The model allows for magazines
to be asymmetric, so this markup will also depend on the relative size of the magazine’s
customer pool. The estimate of the implied markup due to product differentiation for
readers is 7.298 Euros per reader with a standard error of 2.487 (p-value is 0.003). The
equivalent estimate of the implied markup due to product differentiation for advertisers
is 15, 323 Euros per ad with a standard error of 3, 775 (p-value is 0.000). The appar-
ently strong differentiation between magazines from advertisers’ point of view raises the
question of why firms view magazines as differentiated. The existing literature focuses on
12Standard errors are calculated using the ‘Delta’ method (e.g. Greene 2003, Section 5.4.2), which is
also used below for other non-linear functions of parameters.
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the link between readership characteristics and ad rate across publishers, which provides
one view of the source of differentiation (Thompson, 1989 and Koschat and Putsis, 2002).
Another possibility is that other (non-readership) aspects also influence the choice of pub-
lisher/magazine. These include the location of the publisher relative to the advertising
firm, the print quality of ads (glossy or ordinary), the lead time needed to meet the pub-
lication deadline, the possibility of a feature issue related to the firm’s specific products,
the possibility of cross-advertising possibilities with the publishers other magazines, and
more generally, the level of service offered to the advertiser.
The additional terms in equations (6) and (7) are the network externality terms that
arise from the two-sided nature of the market. In the case of the cover price markup,
publishers will charge readers less when advertisers get more profits from advertising in
magazines with more readers. By subsidizing readers, each magazine publisher attempts
to attract more readers, and thereby more demand (profits) from advertisers. Similarly,
by subsidizing advertisers, each publisher attempts to attract more ads so as to attract
readers. Our estimates can provide some insight into which effect is more important.
The estimated network externality term 2ρNai /η for the equilibrium cover price equa-
tion has a mean estimated value of 9.497 Euros per reader with a corresponding standard
error of 2.769 (p-value is 0.001). This is an estimate of how much magazines lower cover
prices (in our sample) as a result of the fact advertisers value magazines with lots of read-
ers. The result suggests magazines may actually set their cover prices below cost. In fact,
the net effect of the product differentiation markup and the network externality discount
is for magazines to set their cover price at 2.198 Euros below cost (note, however, the
standard error on this estimate is 4.741 so the result is not significant at any reasonable
level). In comparison, the mean cover price in our sample is 2.854 Euros. Using the
equilibrium pricing relationship (6) to back out costs which generate the observed mean
cover price implies average costs per reader of 5.052 Euros (the high standard error in
the estimate of the price-cost margin means we could rationalise considerably lower costs
also). According to these results, the magazines discount cover prices, so as to attract
readers, and therefore more lucrative advertisers.
The estimated network externality term 2γSi/β for the equilibrium advertising price
equation has a mean estimated value of 5, 059 Euros with a corresponding standard error
of 2, 133 Euros (p-value is 0.018). This is an estimate of how much equilibrium ad rates
will rise if magazine readers do not value ads. This represents an approximately 50
percent increase in the ad rate (the mean ad rate is 10, 512 Euros). In percentage terms,
this externality appears to be much smaller than that running in the opposite direction.
The results imply that in a symmetric equilibrium, the magazines will set their ad rates
at 10, 264Euros per ad above cost with a corresponding standard error of 5, 518 Euros.
Given actual average ad rates, the backed out costs implied by this result and (7) are costs
of 247 Euros per ad, but with a standard error of 5, 518 Euros in the price-cost margin,
a wide range of observed costs can be consistent with these results.
Sources of profit contributions
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As noted above, the results of our model lend support to the general perception that
readers are subsidized and that magazines receive the bulk of their margins from adver-
tisers. This is confirmed by calculating the direct contribution to profits from readers and
from advertisers. We calculate the equilibrium price-cost markup for readers multiplied
by the number of readers: Si/β−2ρNai Si/η, which is a measure of the direct contribution
to a magazine’s equilibrium profits from readers. Based on our estimates, the implied
value of this expression is −2, 145, 360 Euros (standard error 5, 201, 330) per year, so that
on average, magazines in our sample make losses on the reader market. This is in accor-
dance with other studies on print media markets, for example Ludwig (2003) and Wagner
(1981). Given the insignificance of our estimate, an alternative way of stating this result is
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that magazines obtain no direct profit contribution
from the readership side.
Compare these results to the direct contribution to a magazine’s profit from advertis-
ers, which can be calculated as Nai /η− 2γNai Si/β. The mean estimate over the sample is
7, 035, 460 Euros (per year) with a standard error of 4, 019, 720 (the p-value is 0.080), so
we can reject advertisers make no direct contribution to profits (although only at the 10
percent significance level). Based on these point estimates, magazines more than compen-
sate for their losses on the reader market by gains on the advertising market. Of course,
readers contribute to profits indirectly by raising demand from advertisers, but this is
why readers are “subsidized” in the above equilibrium.
Content pages production cost
Unlike price-cost margins, we cannot determine the optimal level of content implied
by the fitted model without knowing the content page production costs parameters di,
since according to (8), N ci = ψSi/ (2βdi). However, in order to do comparative statics on
the model, it is useful to back out the value of di which makes the value of N
c
i predicted
by the model equal to its (average) counterpart in the data. Thus, we solve (8) for
di = ψSi/ (2N
c
i β), taking the mean over the sample. The implied level of di is 0.124. The
implied value of the marginal production cost of a page of content from the model is then
mci = 2diN
c
i = ψSi/β, which has a mean value (across all observations) of 442 Euros.
It is interesting to compare these cost estimates with direct measures of the magazines
costs. We were able to obtain cost information on three German magazines — Der
Spiegel, Zeit–Magazin and Stern in Ludwig (2003). Ludwig obtained his data, which
refer to 1992, from case studies. Der Spiegel and Stern belong to the group of weekly
political magazines, Zeit–Magazin is the supplement to Die Zeit, another weekly political
magazine. None of the three magazines is part of our sample so comparing their cost data
with our implied costs involves using our model “out-of-sample”.
Ludwig (2003, p. 208) reports that the average per copy content page production cost
is 0.96 Euros for Der Spiegel, 0.62 Euros for Zeit–Magazin and 0.75 Euros for Stern. The




the 1992 data for content pages N ci we obtain the following implied costs for the three
magazines: 0.42 Euro for Der Spiegel, 0.46 Euros for Zeit–Magazin, and 0.39 Euros for
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Stern. Our estimates are lower than Ludwig’s, but not vastly different.
Comparative statics in two-sided markets
Another way to interpret our estimation results is to consider what happens if one
magazine faces an exogenous change in its costs or demand parameters. In particular,
we are interested in how a shock to a magazine on one side of the market affects its
equilibrium price on the other side of the market. While under normal circumstances, an
increase in magazine 1’s costs or demand on the reader side will cause it to charge more to
readers, it is not obvious how such shocks will affect its charges to advertisers. As we will
show, in theory, an increase in cost or demand can increase or decrease the cross-market
price, reflecting two opposing effects. We thus use our estimated parameters to determine
which effect dominates.
Given the linear functional forms implied by the Hotelling model, the comparative
static derivatives do not depend on the unknown parameters f1, f2, c1, c2, b or φ. Rather
they only depend on the estimated parameters, and d(i) which we set to 0.124 from above.
We consider positive demand shocks on the reader side (b) and on the advertising side (φ)
for magazine 1, as well as cost shocks on the reader side (f1) and on the advertising side
(c1) for magazine 1. The effect of the shocks is first obtained assuming network effects are
absent (setting γ = ρ = 0), and then allowing these to be equal to their estimated values.
The results demonstrate an interesting asymmetry between how shocks to the advertising
side affect the readership side and vice-versa.
Totally differentiating the system defined by (1)-(4) and (6)-(8) for i = 1 and 2, the
impact of cost and demand shocks on prices on the opposite side are summarized in the
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Consider first an exogenous increase in demand by readers for magazine 1. We model
this by considering an increase in b. When network effects are ignored, the results are
standard. Magazine 1, facing higher demand, increases its cover price. As in a standard
Hotelling model, when one firm enjoys an exogenous increase in demand at the expense
of its rival, it will charge more (and its rival will charge less). Despite the price increase,
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magazine 1 still retains higher market share. In addition, the negative impact of the
higher price on market share is partially offset by the fact that magazine 1 increases its
production of content to take advantage of the higher equilibrium margins on readers.
Our main interest is in what happens to the choice of advertising rates on the other side
of the market. When network effects are assumed away, the answer is nothing.
Allowing for network effects, the theoretical implications for advertising rates of an
increase in reader demand are ambiguous, and depend on the sign of the expression
ρ − ηγ/β. A high value of ρ means that the exogenous increase in readership demand
will translate into a relatively large increase in advertising demand. As a result, the
magazine will want to increase its advertising rates to exploit this higher demand. With
more readers, magazine 1 becomes superior from the advertisers’ perspective, which allows
magazine 1 to charge more to advertisers. We call this the cross-market demand effect.
On the other hand, a high value of ηγ/β means that when magazine 1 enjoys higher
margins on the reader side of the market (as a result of the exogenous increase in demand
by readers), it will want to cut ad rates since doing so generates a large increase in
advertisers (the η effect), and the increase in advertisers generates a large increase in
the now more profitable readers (the γ effect). This effect has to be measured relative
to the level of β, the sensitivity of reader demand to cover prices. If β is high, then it
does not make sense to cut ad prices a lot to generate the extra reader demand, when
this demand can anyway be generated by a small decrease in cover prices. We call this
effect the cross-market subsidy effect, since it captures the incentive for a magazine to
subsidize one side to capture the higher margins on the other (now) more profitable side.
Our estimated results imply the cross-market demand effect dominates the cross-market
subsidy effect for a shock to reader demand.13
This result means the exogenous increase in demand from readers increases equilibrium
charges to advertisers. Magazine 1 does not want to subsidise advertisers so as to attract
a few more readers. Rather, it wants to exploit the larger effect of higher reader demand
on advertising demand by charging advertisers more. We find da1/db = 896.53, so roughly
speaking, an exogenous increase in magazine 1’s market share of readers from 50 to 55
percent will cause it to charge advertisers 44.83 Euros more per ad.
Consider instead an exogenous increase in demand for advertising in magazine 1. The
increase in demand from advertisers leads magazine 1 to charge higher ad prices (the
normal Hotelling response). Without network effects, there is no impact on the other side
of the market (the equilibrium cover price and production of content remains unchanged).
Allowing for network effects raises the question of how magazine 1 will adjust its cover
price and production of content.
Whether magazine 1 will respond to the higher advertising demand and price by raising
or lowering cover prices depends on the sign of the expression γ − (1− ψ2S/βd) (βρ/η).
13Using the delta approach to obtain the standard error on ρ− ηγ/β, we find we can reject at the 5%
level that this expression is zero in favor of the alternative, which is that it is positive (p-value is 0.0152
from this one-sided test).
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If the cross-market demand effect (γ) dominates, then higher advertising demand will
increase reader demand sufficiently such that magazine 1 will want to increase its cover
price. If, on the other hand, the cross-market subsidy effect (βρ/η) dominates, then higher
advertising demand will cause magazine 1 to lower its cover price. Lower cover prices
enable magazine 1 to attract more readers, and thereby more advertisers, so as to profit
from its now higher margin on advertisers. The cross-market subsidy effect is weakened
somewhat by the ability of magazine 1 to attract more readers by producing more content
rather than lowering the cover price. This is measured by the term (1− ψ2S/βd), which
reduces the cross-market subsidy effect by about 23 percent in our sample. Despite this, we
still find the cross-market subsidy effect dominates in this direction, so that the magazine
will actually decrease its cover price in response to the demand increase from advertisers
(and it will also increase its production of content).14
Our estimates imply dp1/dφ = −1.768, which suggests an increase in advertising
market share from 50 to 55 percent will cause magazine 1 to charge readers 9 Euro cents
less, and to produce an additional 21 content pages. These results provide another sense
in which advertisers care more about the number of readers than vice-versa. A positive
shock to reader demand raises a magazine’s equilibrium ad rate, whereas a positive shock
to advertising demand lowers a magazine’s cover price. These differing responses reflect
that, when measured relative to how easy it is to attract each type of user by adjusting
prices, it is easier to attract more advertisers by subsidizing readers than vice-versa.
We repeat the above exercises but with cost shocks rather than demand shocks. With-
out network effects, the effect of an increase in costs on a magazine’s demand and margins
is the opposite to that of an increase in demand. Facing higher cost on one side of the
market, magazine 1 raises its respective price, but not one-for-one given its rival’s cost
has not changed. The result is a reduction in the magazine’s demand and margins on the
particular side of the market. Allowing for network effects thus causes cost shocks to have
the opposite effect on the cross-market prices as demand shocks. Specifically, if the costs
of each reader increases for magazine 1, then magazine 1 will respond to the decreased
equilibrium number of readers by lowering its price to advertisers. For instance, an in-
crease in the cost to magazine 1 of one Euro per reader leads the magazine to decrease
its ad rate by 61.42 Euros. In contrast, if the cost of providing each ad increases for
magazine 1, then magazine 1 will respond to the lower advertising margins by increasing
the cover price to readers, since “subsidizing” readers to attract advertisers is no longer
so profitable. For example, a 1, 000 Euro increase in the cost to magazine 1 of providing
an ad, leads the magazine to increase its cover price by around six Euro cents, and cut
the number of its content pages by about 14 pages.
Separate magazine group estimates
Magazine group fixed effects drop out from our estimation equations since we esti-
14Note that the sign of γ − βρ/η is the opposite of ρ − γη/β, so provided the term (1− ψ2S/βd) is
sufficiently small, this result follows from our previous result.
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mate our model in first differences. It may, of course, be the case that the slope co-
efficients are different for each magazine group and that the estimates for each maga-
zine group deviate significantly from our results obtained from the pooled estimation.
With on average about ten observations per magazine group, it is not feasible to al-
low slope coefficients to vary across each group. However, one can provide some evi-
dence on whether each of the parameter values varies between one of the larger maga-
zine groups and the rest of the groups. We conduct such a test with our two largest
magazine groups, ‘Photo magazines’ (29 observations after first taking differences) and
‘Do–It–Yourself magazines’ (23 observations after taking first differences). Specifically,
we test for whether each coefficient varies between one of these groups separately and
the estimate when all magazines are included. For instance, to see whether γ varies be-
tween ‘Photo magazines’ and that for our pooled data, we estimate γg/γ from ∆s1t =
γ(∆Na1t −∆Na2t) + ψ(∆N c1t −∆N c2t)− β(∆p1t −∆p2t) +Dg γg(∆Na1t −∆Na2t), where Dg
denotes a group dummy (here, it takes the value one for the photo group). The coefficient
γg is then the deviation of the estimate of γ from ‘Photo magazines’ from the coefficient
estimate when all magazines are pooled, and γg/γ scales this deviation by the level of the
estimate to allow comparison across parameters. Table 5 provides the results. The major-
ity of the coefficient estimates remain stable across the separate groups. Statistically, the
parameter estimates seem to be less stable on the advertising side, although in terms of
the magnitude of the effects, the largest deviations arise from the parameter γ (the extent
to with readers value ads), even though this deviation is not statistically significant.
Alternative demand models
The demand system we estimate in (9) and (10) is linear when specified in market
shares. An alternative specification is that a magazine’s share of advertisers just depends
on the respective ad rates per subscriber. Thus, we consider the alternative model
M s1t= γ (M Na1t− M Na2t)+ψ (M N c1t− M N c2t)−β (M p1t− M p2t)+error1 (16)
M na1t = κ (M (a2t/S2t)− M (a1t/S1t)) + error2 (17)
The readership share equation is specified as before, but now the advertising share equa-
tion depends on the ratio of ad rates to the number of readers. Given this new model
and our model are not nested, we apply the “encompassing” test (Mizon, 1984). The
empirical strategy is to re-run the demand system estimation, this time inserting the ex-
planatory variables from both our demand model and the alternative model. We then
run a “non–nested” F -test for significance of the model parameters of our model and the
alternative model. Performing such a test for our model against model (17) leads to an
F statistics for the parameter of our model, ρ and η, of 50.622 (p-value 0.000). The F
statistic corresponding to the parameter of the alternative model, κ, is 0.172 (p-value
0.679), so that we cannot accept the alternative model.
A different form suggested by some theoretical papers that have advertisers signing
up to both publishers (multihoming) is that advertising is purely a function of the ad
rate to subscriber ratio at each magazine, and there is effectively no competition across
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publishers on this side of the market.15 A modification of our specification which captures
this possibility is the following
M s1t= γ (M Na1t− M Na2t)+ψ (M N c1t− M N c2t)−β (M p1t− M p2t)+ M ε1t− M ε2t(18)
M Na1t= κ1 (M (a1t/S1t))+error1 (19)
M Na2t= κ2 (M (a2t/S2t)+error2 (20)
Although this leads to similar estimates of (18) to our benchmark model, the estimates
of κ1 and κ2 are insignificant at all reasonable levels of significance (furthermore κ1 is
negative and κ2 is positive). An “encompassing” test leads to the result that we cannot
reject either model. However, the F statistic for the probability of not accepting our
model is 264.628 (p-value is 0.000),16 while the F statistic for the probability of not
accepting this alternative model is 4.757 (p-value is 0.011), suggesting we are more likely
to reject the alternative model. The fact that the alternative model produces implausible
parameter estimates of κ1 and κ2 suggests some misspecification in the model of (19) and
(20).
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we obtained estimates of the parameters of a two-sided market model of
competing magazine publishers. Using panel data from the German magazine industry
between 1972 and 2003, we find non-explosive network benefits, so that the estimated
demand system is well behaved. We ask, what is the markup charged to advertisers
relative to that charged to readers? Our results are consistent with the conventional
wisdom that advertisers value readers more than readers value advertisements, and that
as a result, magazines “subsidize” cover prices, and make their profit from advertisers.
We apply this estimated model to consider cross-market comparative statics. Reflect-
ing that advertisers value readers more than readers value advertisers, we find an increase
in reader demand results in an increase in ad rates while an increase in advertising de-
mand results in a decrease in cover prices. This asymmetric result reflects the incentive
to subsidize readers to attract additional advertisers when the advertising side becomes
more lucrative, but not vice-versa. Rather, if demand on the reader side increases (or
costs fall), our estimated model implies there is an incentive to increase ad rates so as
exploit the resulting increased demand on the advertising side.
Given the limited data used in this study, we treat our results as illustrative. The
approach used shows how one can draw conclusions on the role of network effects in
15See footnote 7 for a brief discussion of this literature.
16To perform a test for encompassing, the dependent variable needs to be identical, which is why we
multiply both sides of our advertising demand model by N to transform it into a level equation as in the
alternative model. We also estimate both demand equations implied by our model.
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determining the structure of pricing in studying two-sided markets. Future work could
explore collecting and using a more extensive data set on magazine pricing. One approach
worth considering is to use international data on specific magazines segments, where
magazine segments in different countries, regions or languages can be considered to have
different demands and costs, and for which the demand from each side of the market
(advertising versus readership) should depend on country/region specific factors that can
be observed.
References
Armstrong, M. (2004) “Competition in two-sided markets,” mimeo, University College
London.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995) “Automobile Prices in Market Equilibrium,”
Econometrica, 63, 841–890.
Bucklin, R.E., R. Caves and A.W. Lo (1989) “Games of survival in the US newspaper
industry,” Applied Economics 21, 631–649.
Caillaud, B. and B. Jullien (2003) “Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation
Service Providers,” RAND Journal of Economics 34, 309-328.
Dertouzos, J.N. and W.B. Trautman (1990) “Economic effects of media concentration:
estimates from a model of the newspaper firm,” Journal of Industrial Economics
39(1), 1–14.
Dewenter, R. (2003) “The Economics of Media Markets,” University of the Federal
Armed Forces Hamburg. Discussion Paper No. 10.
Doganoglu, T. and J. Wright (2004) “Multihoming and compatibility,” mimeo, National
University of Singapore.
Evans, D. (2003a) “The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets,” Yale
Journal on Regulation, forthcoming.
Evans, D. (2003b) “Some Empirical Aspects of Multi-sided Platform Industries,” Review
of Network Economics 2, 1-20.
Ferrando, J., J.J. Gabszewics, D. Laussel and N. Sonnac (2003) “Two–sided network
effects and competition: an application to media industries,” Universite´ de Louvain
working paper.
Gabszewicz, J.J., D. Laussel and N. Sonnac (2001) “Press advertising and the ascent of
the ‘Pense´e unique’,” European Economic Review 45, 645–651.
Gandall, N., M. Kende and R. Rob (2000) “The dynamics of technological adoption
in hardware/software systems: The case of compact disk players,” Rand Journal of
Economics 31(1), 43-61.
18
Greene, W. (2003) “Econometric Analysis (4th international edition),” Prentice–Hall,
Upper Saddle River.
Hausman, J. and W. Taylor (1981) “Panel and Unobservable Individual Effects,” Econo-
metrica 49, 1377–1398.
Hausman, J., G. Leonard, and J. D. Zona (1994) “Competitive Analysis with Differen-
tiated Products,” Annales D’Economie et de Statistique, 34, 159–80.
Jahreszeitenverlag (1981-2003). “Funktions–Analyse: Factbook fu¨r Inhalte und Portaits
vvon Zeitschriften,” Jahreszeitenverlag, Hamburg.
Kaiser, U. (2003) “The effects of website provision on the demand for German women’s
magazines,” University of Southern Denmark mimeo.
Koschat, M. and W. Putsis. (2002) “Audience characteristics and bundling: a hedonic
analysis of magazine advertising rates,” Journal of Marketing Research 39(3), 262-
273.
Ludwig, J. (1996) “Wie sich publizistische Hochkultur ‘rechnet’: Ein o¨konomisches
Portra¨t der ‘Zeit’,” Publizistik 41(3), 277–297.
Ludwig, J. (2003) “Mikroo¨konomie der Medien,” in Altmeppen, K.-D. and M. Kar-
masin (Eds.) Grundlagen der Medieno¨konomie: Kommunikations– und Medienwis-
senschaft, Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen, 187–214.
Mizon, G.E. (1984) “The Encompassing Approach in Econometrics,” in Wallis, K.F.
and D.F. Hendry (Eds.) Quantitative Economics and Econometric Analysis, Basil
Blackwell, Oxford, 135–172.
Reddaway, W.B. (1963) “The economics of newspapers,” The Economic Journal 73,
201–218.
Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (2003) “Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets,” Jour-
nal of the European Economics Association 1, 990-1029.
Rochet, J-C. and J. Tirole (2004) ”Defining Two-Sided Markets,” mimeo, IDEI and
GREMAQ, Toulouse.
Rosse, J.N. (1967) “Daily newspapers, monopolistic competition, and economies of
scale,” American Economic Review 57(2), 522–533.
Rosse, J.N. (1970) “Estimating cost function parameters without using cost data: illus-
trated methodology,” Econometrica 38(2), 256–275.
Rysman, M. (2004), “Competition Between Networks: A Study of the Market for Yellow
Pages,” Review of Economic Studies 71(2), 483-512.
Saloner, G. and A. Shepard (1995) “Adoption of Technologies with network effects:
An empirical examination of the adoption of Automated Teller Machines,” Rand
Journal of Economics 26, 479-501.
19
Thompson, R.S. (1984) “Structure and conduct in local advertising markets: the case of
Irish newspapers,” Journal of Industrial Economics 33(2), 241–249.
Thompson, R.S. (1989) “Circulation versus advertiser appeal in the newspaper industry:
an empirical investigation,” Journal of Industrial Economics 37(3), 259–271.
Wagner, K. (1981) “The newspaper industry in Britain, Germany and the United States,”
National Institute Economic Review 95, 81-88.
A Appendix: Demand systems
In this appendix, we detail the theoretical model which leads to the demand system
estimated. Suppose there is a measure S of consumers who will buy from one of the
two rival magazines. These consumers are located at x, where x is uniformly distributed
on the unit interval [0, 1], and the magazines are located at either ends of the interval.
Suppose a consumer located at x gets net utility v1 if she subscribes to magazine 1, where




1 − βp1 + ε1 −
x
2
and gets net utility v2 if she subscribes to magazine 2, where








We have normalized the Hotelling transportation cost to one half, and allowed for different
degrees of product differentiation by introducing the parameter β on prices.
The utility of reading a magazine is assumed to be a linear function of the number
of pages of ‘ads’ Nai in magazine i, and the number of pages of content N
c
i in magazine
i. The consumers’ net utility is decreasing in the price charged by magazine i, denoted
pi. These three variables are observable. The remaining variables are unobservable.
The parameter v0 is assumed to be high enough so that all consumers want to buy
one of the magazines. The parameter b measures the intrinsic consumer preference for
magazine 1 over magazine 2; that is, brand loyalty. The random variable εi has mean
zero and measures the unobservable intrinsic benefits of subscribing to magazine i that
all consumers obtain (these will be allowed to vary over time in the empirical model).
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S2 = S − S1. (22)
Dividing (21) and (22) by S gives expressions for market shares. Despite the error terms
εi, we assume these theoretical market shares lie between 0 and 1, which they will do by
construction in the data.
The advertisers’ choice of magazine is modelled in a similar way. There is a measure
N of firms that will advertise in one of the two magazines. Let ai be the ad price set
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by magazine i. Then a firm gets a contribution to profit from advertising in magazine i
that is assumed to be a linear function of the number of readers of the magazine, and the
price they are charged for the ad ai, as well as some exogenous preference for each of the
magazines. This preference for a particular publisher can capture how well the magazine’s
target audience fits with the firm’s ideal target audience (assuming, for instance, a reader’s
choice of magazine correlates with some other variables such as income or location, which
the advertiser cares about). Alternatively, the advertiser’s choice of publisher might relate
to other (non-readership) aspects, such as the location of the publisher relative to the
advertising firm, the print quality of ads (glossy or ordinary paper), the lead time needed
to meet the publication deadline, the possibility of a feature issue related to the firm’s
specific products, any cross-advertising possibilities in the publishers other magazines,
and more generally, the service level offered to the advertiser. To model these varied
factors that differentiate publishers, we simply suppose firms are located uniformly on the
unit interval [0, 1], with transportation costs for a firm located at y of y/2 for advertising
in magazine 1 and transportation costs (1−y)/2 for advertising in magazine 2 (and allow
for varying degrees of product differentiation by introducing a parameter on ad rates).
The contribution to a firm’s profits of advertising in magazine 1 is thus given as
pi1 = pi0 + φ+ ρS1 − ηa1 + ξ1 − y
2
and the contribution to a firm’s profit of advertising in magazine 2 is
pi2 = pi0 + ρS2 − ηa2 + ξ2 − 1− y
2
,
where ξi is some mean zero unobservable “benefit” firms get from having an ad in magazine
i, which will be allowed to vary through time. The parameter φ measures the intrinsic
preference of advertisers for magazine 1 over magazine 2 (the brand loyalty of magazine
1), while pi0 is assumed to be high enough so that all firms want to advertise in one of
the magazines. Since there is assumed to be one ad per firm, the number of ads in each









Na2 = N −Na1 . (24)
Dividing (23) and (24) by N gives expressions for market shares. Again, despite the
random error term ξi, we assume these theoretical market shares lie between 0 and 1,
which they will do by construction in the data.
B Appendix: Multihoming
In this appendix we show how our model can be extended in a way that ensures our
existing results still apply even when some people read two (rival) magazines and some
firms put the same ad in two (rival) magazines. Following the literature on two-sided
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markets, we call this situation “multihoming”. This appendix also provides evidence that
multihoming is not widespread on either side of the magazine markets we consider. Both
findings suggest our results should be robust to the presence of multihoming users.
The extension of our model follows Doganoglu and Wright (2004). They allow for
partial multihoming in a generic model by allowing for two types of agents on each side
— those with a high network benefit parameter who always choose to multihome and those
with a low network benefit parameter who always choose a single platform (singlehome).
In the context of our model, we define the proportion of high-types on the reader side
as λR and the proportion of high-types on the advertiser side as λA. Consistent with
Doganoglu and Wright, we assume these parameters are fixed. If there are R1 readers who
buy magazine 1 exclusively, R2 readers who buy magazine exclusively, and RM who buy
both magazines, then λR = RM/ (R1 +R2 +RM). Likewise, λA = AM/ (A1 + A2 + AM)
where A denotes the number of advertisers. Using our earlier notation, the total number
of readers of magazine i can then be written as Si = Ri+RM , and likewise for advertisers,




2 = A1+A2+2AM .
Denoting the market shares of magazine 1 for low type readers and advertisers as
sL1 and n
L
1 respectively, the previous market share equations (1)-(4) still apply as before
to these types of agents. The inclusion (or not) of multihoming agents is irrelevant to
the low types’ decision of which magazine to choose, since users get the benefit of these
multihoming agents regardless of which magazine they choose. However, the left hand side
share terms in these equations now only apply for low types (which we do not observe
directly), so these have to be rewritten in terms of observables. For instance, on the
readership side we use the observed value of s1 = S1/ (S1 + S2) in the estimation of
(1), but the market share implied by the theory is now sL1 = R1/ (R1 +R2). Using the
definitions of λR and Si above, we can rewrite s
L
1 in terms of observables (and likewise
for nL1 ) so that s
L
i = ((1 + λR) si − λR) / (1− λR) and nLi = ((1 + λA)nai − λA) / (1− λA),









(b+ γ (Na1 −Na2 ) + ψ (N c1 −N c2)− β (p1 − p2) + ε1 − ε2) (25)









(φ+ ρ (S1 − S2)− η (a1 − a2) + ξ1 − ξ2) (27)
na2 = 1− na1. (28)
After taking first differences, the implied demand system becomes statistically identical
to that in (9) and (10). Assuming that magazines cannot set different prices depending on
whether agents singlehome or multihome, the profit function for each magazine is identical





nai is now defined in (27). Since the estimated demand system is the same as before, all
our implied results using the first order conditions (6)-(8) still apply. The only difference
arises from the interpretation of the underlying parameters, which if calculated by using
the adjustment terms above, apply to the utility functions for low type agents on each
side of the market. (By construction, high types will have higher values of γ and ρ than
low types, but the same values of ψ, β, and η.)
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To give some idea of how many agents multihome, we calculate values for λR and
λA, the proportion of readers who multihome and the proportion of advertisers who
multihome. Unfortunately, we do not have systematic information on multihoming for all
magazines or all years in our sample. Instead, we collected information on multihoming
from two sources. On the reader side, we have consumer survey data for most of the
magazines in our sample from 1997-2003. On the advertisers side, we purchased all
available magazines in our sample published in September 2004 and counted duplicated
ads.
Information on multiple readership of magazines from the same magazine group is
taken from AG.MA, as described in Section 3. The original source of the AG.MA data is
a consumer survey that is biannually collected by the “Institut fu¨r Demoskopie, Allens-
bach”. Around 20,000 interviews are conducted annually in Germany. This data contains
information on what fraction of magazine 1’s readers also read the next available issue of
magazine 2 (and vice-versa).17 If we define the fraction of readers of magazine i who also
read magazine j as λi,j, so λi,j = RM/(Ri + RM), then λR can be calculated from the
observed λi,j ratios by taking the inverse of 1/λi,j + 1/λj,i − 1. The results, reported in
table 6, indicate multihoming on the reader-side is typically in the 5− 10 percent range.
Taking the weighted average value from table 6, using the number of observations on each
magazine group as the weights, implies λR = 0.0786.
To obtain a measure of the degree of multihoming amongst advertisers, we analyzed
magazines in our sample for issues published in September 2004 by purchasing all available
magazines in our sample on September 8th, 2004. Magazines from the same magazine
group were published either the same day (in the case of weekly magazines) or the same
month (in the case of monthly magazines). Only Goldene Gesundheit was unavailable as
it exited the market in June 1997.
Counting ads within each two-magazine group that appear in both magazines simul-
taneously, and dividing by the total number of distinct ads within the group, we obtain
multihoming percentages of 10.29 percent for ‘Entertaining’, 14.29 percent for ‘Photo’,
16.66 percent for ‘Do-it-yourself’, 17.95 percent for ‘Food’, 15.00 percent for ‘Gardening’,
10.63 percent for ‘Monthly high priced women’s’, 37.21 percent for ‘Weekly counselling
women’s’, and 30.16 percent for ‘PC’. These numbers indicate a higher degree of mul-
tihoming on the advertising side than the reader side. Taking the weighted average
value, using the number of observations on each magazine group as the weights, implies
λA = 0.169.
The presence of multihoming agents implies our estimated parameters understate the
true magnitude of parameters in the agents’ utility functions. The above results give an
idea of how much parameter estimates need to be scaled up on each side. Specifically,
the estimated parameters γ̂, ψ̂ and β̂ in table 3 should be multiplied by 1.171 to get
the parameter values which apply to the singlehoming readers. Likewise, the estimated
parameters ρ̂ and η̂ in table 3 should be multiplied by 1.407 to get the parameter values
17This measure may overstate the level of multihoming for two reasons. First, people
may be more likely to read, say, Madame one month and Vogue the next, than to read
both magazines in the same month. It also seems likely that the degree of multihoming
will be higher in readership than in actual purchase.
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which apply to the singlehoming advertisers. However, to the extent the model above
is valid, none of our implied results are affected by this scaling since they are based on
the estimated demand system, which remains valid under the assumptions of the model.
To the extent the assumptions of the extended model are not valid, the relatively low
proportion of multihoming agents for the markets we study suggests that our results
should not be affected too greatly.
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Table 1: Sample selection
Segment Title 1 Title 2 Period Obs
Included magazines Begin End
Health Goldene Ges. Medizin heute 1977 Q1 1979 Q2 2
Entertaining Bunte Gala 1994 Q2 1999 Q1 4
Photo Color Foto fotoMAGAZIN 1972 Q3 2003 Q4 31
Do-it-yourself SelberMachen Selbst ist der Mann 1979 Q1 2003 Q4 25
Food Essen & Trinken Meine Familie & Ich 1973 Q2 1986 Q3 12
Gardening Flora Mein scho¨ner Garten 1986 Q2 1998 Q1 11
M. high priced women’s Madame Vogue 1983 Q1 1988 Q3 5
W. counselling women’s Bella Tina 1979 Q3 1983 Q1 3
PC Chip PC Welt 1985.Q2 1993.Q2 7
Excluded magazines
Mag. w/ spec. char. Neue Revue Readers Digest Das Beste 1972 Q3 1990 Q4 18
Travel Geo Saison Merian 1990 Q1 2003 Q4 14
Young illustrated Max Prinz 1991 Q1 2003 Q4 13
City/lifestyle Tempo Wiener 1986 Q4 1994 Q3 7
Sports Sport Illustrierte kicker-sportmagazin 1972 Q3 1976 Q3 3
Fitness Fit for Fun Vital 1994 Q2 1995 Q4 1
Youth Bravo Musikexpress 1977 Q1 1977 Q4 1
Riddles Extra Ra¨tsel Freizeit Revue 1985 Q1 1986 Q1 1
Fiction Romanwoche Meine Geschichte 1984 Q1 2003 Q4 0
Table 2: Summary statistics for magazine titles
Median Mean Std. Dev.
Circulation (Si) 706,681 955,577 1,081,557
Advertisements (Nai ) 471.8 673.3 527.7
Content pages (N ci ) 1,582 2,003 1,170
Cover prices (pi) 2.668 2.854 1.170
Ad rates (ai) 10,021 10,512 4,128
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Table 3: GMM estimation results from the share equations
Coeff. Std. Err. p–value
Readers value ads (γ) 0.1813 0.0259 0.000
Readers value content (ψ) 0.0317 0.0157 0.044
Competition for readers (β) 0.0685 0.0233 0.003
Advertisers value readers (ρ) 0.2301 0.0276 0.000
Competition for advertisers (η) 0.0326 0.0080 0.000
Note: For readibility, estimated coefficients and standard errors are
all multiplied by one thousand except for ρ where they are multiplied
by one million, and for β where they are left unchanged.
Table 4: SUR estimation results of share equations
Coeff. Std. Err. p–value
Readers value ads (γ) 0.2537 0.0336 0.000
Readers value content (ψ) -0.0200 0.0145 0.166
Competition for readers (β) 0.0272 0.0209 0.194
Advertisers value readers (ρ) 0.2296 0.0451 0.000
Competition for advertisers (η) 0.0159 0.0117 0.172
Note: For readibility, estimated coefficients and standard errors are
all multiplied by one thousand except for ρ where they are multiplied
by one million, and for β where they are left unchanged.
Table 5: Allowing coefficients to differ across groups
Do–it–yourself Photo
as separate group as separate group
Coeff. p–value Coeff. p–value
Readers value ads (γg/γ) -3.1538 0.4578 -6.9623 0.3561
Readers value content (ψg/ψ) -3.2381 0.5921 -1.6122 0.0528
Competition for readers (βg/β) -0.6728 0.2487 -0.4484 0.3151
Advertisers value readers (ρg/ρ) -0.9231 0.0078 1.6044 0.0184
Competition for advertisers (ηg/η) -0.2250 0.4964 -1.4051 0.0071
Note: Coefficient estimates with subscript g denote deviations of a particular
parameter from the average coefficient values for all magazines when considering
just group g. More details are provided in the text.
Table 6: Multihoming percentages for readers
Average
share
Group 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 multireader
Health 3.56 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3.56
Entertaining 2.64 3.53 3.55 5.04 6.23 5.73 5.54 4.61
Photo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Do-it-yourself 11.08 11.98 11.11 7.81 10.47 9.25 7.49 9.88
Food 6.38 5.82 5.53 4.29 6.66 5.21 3.88 5.40
Gardening 4.43 6.16 5.35 5.12 5.35 5.20 3.45 5.01
Monthly high priced women’s 6.38 6.78 5.80 6.38 5.21 6.56 4.86 6.00
Weekly counselling women’s 11.40 11.73 10.73 11.11 11.62 9.65 8.48 10.67
PC 16.53 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9.49 11.50 12.51
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